American Bible Society v. City of Manila, GR No. L-9637, April 30, 1957

CASE DIGEST

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898. The defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.

During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles and other religious materials at a very minimal profit.

On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).

Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees.

Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).

Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:

(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.

Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956)

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Facts: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested. Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in view of his finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused commited the crime charged.

HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER. Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and there must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal should, instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.

Alvarez v. CFI, G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

On June 3, 1936, the chief of of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented to Judge David, presiding judge of CFI of Tayabas, alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner is keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.

In his oath the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his knowledge of the facts but the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon this questioned affidavit, the judge issued the search warrant, ordering the search of the petitioners house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the immediate delivery of such to him (judge). With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at 7 o'clock of the night and seized and took possession of various articles belonging to the petitioner.

The petitioner asks that the warrant of issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at anytime of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents, and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.

Issues:

1.) What is the nature of searchers and seizures as contemplated in the law?

2.) What is required of the oath in the issuance of search warrant?

3.) What is the purpose of the disposition in addition to the affidavit?

4.) Whether or not the search warrant could be serve at night?

5.) Whether or not the seizure of evidence to use in an investigation is constitutional?

6.) Whether or not there was a waiver of constitutional guarantees?

Held:

As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of the highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by them(State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizure or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed., [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S. 14 Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).

Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. All illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law. ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S. 70 Law, ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S. 282 Fed., 413; U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed., 231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).

Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.

Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at night.

The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.

At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.

The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it reffered but to the institution of criminal proceedings fro violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.

Almario v. Alba, G.R. No. L-66088 January 25, 1984

CASE DIGEST

Facts: As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on January 27, 1984 to either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered by simple YES or NO answers.  Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 (“grant” as an additional mode of acquiring lands belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the government of a land reform program and a socialreform program), which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no fair and proper submission following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC. The petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people to study the meaning and implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the electorate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a later date.

HELD: The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not “grant” of public land and “urban land reform” are unwise or improvident or whether or not theproposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. The questions are presented for their determination. Assuming that a member or some members of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public land or an urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote “NO” in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes. The issue before us has nothing to do with the wisdom of the proposed amendments, their desirability, or the danger of the power being abused. The issue is whether or not the voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or the dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a case that the average voter does not know the meaning of “grant” of public land or of “urban land reform.

Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, GR No L-69401 June 23, 1987

CASE DIGEST

Facts: Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives.  A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing  and photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem  due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue: Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them.

Held: Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution: Theright of the people to be secure in their  persons,houses, papers, and effects againstunreasonablesearches and seizures of whatever nature and forany purpose shall not be violated,and no searchwarrant or warrant of arrest shall issueexcept uponprobable cause to be determined by the judge, orsuch other responsible officer as may beauthorizedby law, after examination under oath or affirmationof the complainant and thewitnesses he mayproduce, and particularlydescribing the place to besearched, and the persons or thingsto be seized. The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the  arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”

Alejano v. Cabuay, GR 160792, August 25, 2005

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which required respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the CA. CA dismissed the petition because the detainees are already charged of coup d’etat. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment.

ISSUE: What is the objective of the writ of habeas corpus?

HELD: The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.

Agustin v. Edu, G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979, 88 SCRA 195

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: This was an original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition.Petitioner was an owner of a volkswagen beetle car,model 13035 already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights which could serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No 229, as amended, as well as the Implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No 1 issued by Land transportation Commission.Respondent Land Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu issued memorandum circular no 32 pursuant to Letter of Instructions No.229,as amended. It required the use of early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles. Petitioner alleged that the letter of instructions, as well as the implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether the Letter of Instruction imposes valid measure of police power?

HELD: YES, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229,as amended as well as the implementing rules and regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid measure of police power. The Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals and the United Nations Organization was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices.It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance,between the International law and municipal law in applying the rule municipal law prevails.