CASE DIGEST
Facts:
On June 3, 1936, the chief of of the secret service
of the Anti-Usury Board presented to Judge David, presiding judge of CFI of
Tayabas, alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner is
keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas documents, receipts, lists, chits and
other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender
charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.
In his oath the chief of the secret service did not
swear to the truth of his statements upon his knowledge of the facts but the
information received by him from a reliable person. Upon this questioned
affidavit, the judge issued the search warrant, ordering the search of the
petitioners house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and
documents and the immediate delivery of such to him (judge). With said warrant,
several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and
residence at 7 o'clock of the night and seized and took possession of various
articles belonging to the petitioner.
The petitioner asks that the warrant of issued by
the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and
the seizure, at anytime of the day or night, of certain accounting books,
documents, and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta,
Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the
Anti-Usury board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set
aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.
Issues:
1.) What is the nature of searchers and seizures as
contemplated in the law?
2.) What is required of the oath in the issuance of
search warrant?
3.) What is the purpose of the disposition in
addition to the affidavit?
4.) Whether or not the search warrant could be
serve at night?
5.) Whether or not the seizure of evidence to use
in an investigation is constitutional?
6.) Whether or not there was a waiver of
constitutional guarantees?
Held:
As the protection of the citizen and the
maintenance of his constitutional right is one of the highest duties and
privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a
liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to
prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the rights
secured by them(State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231
Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the
general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizure or search warrants
must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed., [2d], 189; Leonard vs.
U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S. 14 Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118
So., 613).
Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace
against which the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term
"unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution
or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or
unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general language.
All illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are
reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in
any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration
of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the
presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law. ed., 374; Peru vs.
U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S. 70
Law, ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S. 282 Fed., 413; U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed.,
231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).
Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58
provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the
witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the
existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses.
Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because
his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty
of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the
search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if
the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses
having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore,
that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the
affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes
that the search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the
affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant
issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is
equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at night.
The only description of the articles given in the
affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being
kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers
used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a
usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into
consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other
more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly
because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents
thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal
provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby
placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.
At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised
before the court it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really
been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and
later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the
petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of
books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them
as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were
found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is
equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the
compulsion of an accused to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal,
42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed.,
365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs.
U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents
in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the
petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him,
we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should
be returned to him.
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that
the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search warrant or the
proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his
constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine
of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We
are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner
has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if there
was a compromise it reffered but to the institution of criminal proceedings fro
violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for
the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure
of the articles in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner
protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the
insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.