American Bible Society v. City of Manila, GR No. L-9637, April 30, 1957

CASE DIGEST

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898. The defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.

During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles and other religious materials at a very minimal profit.

On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).

Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees.

Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).

Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:

(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.

Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956)

CASE DIGEST

Facts: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested. Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in view of his finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused commited the crime charged.

HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER. Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and there must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal should, instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.

Alvarez v. CFI, G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

On June 3, 1936, the chief of of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented to Judge David, presiding judge of CFI of Tayabas, alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner is keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.

In his oath the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his knowledge of the facts but the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon this questioned affidavit, the judge issued the search warrant, ordering the search of the petitioners house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the immediate delivery of such to him (judge). With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at 7 o'clock of the night and seized and took possession of various articles belonging to the petitioner.

The petitioner asks that the warrant of issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at anytime of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents, and papers belonging to him in his residence situated in Infanta, Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.

Issues:

1.) What is the nature of searchers and seizures as contemplated in the law?

2.) What is required of the oath in the issuance of search warrant?

3.) What is the purpose of the disposition in addition to the affidavit?

4.) Whether or not the search warrant could be serve at night?

5.) Whether or not the seizure of evidence to use in an investigation is constitutional?

6.) Whether or not there was a waiver of constitutional guarantees?

Held:

As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of the highest duties and privileges of the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by them(State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizure or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed., [2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S. 14 Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).

Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. All illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law. ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S. 70 Law, ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S. 282 Fed., 413; U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed., 231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).

Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.

Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at night.

The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.

At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be returned to him.

The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second, because if there was a compromise it reffered but to the institution of criminal proceedings fro violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.

Almario v. Alba, G.R. No. L-66088 January 25, 1984

CASE DIGEST

Facts: As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on January 27, 1984 to either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered by simple YES or NO answers.  Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 (“grant” as an additional mode of acquiring lands belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the government of a land reform program and a socialreform program), which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no fair and proper submission following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC. The petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for more time for the people to study the meaning and implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the electorate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a later date.

HELD: The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not “grant” of public land and “urban land reform” are unwise or improvident or whether or not theproposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can decide. The questions are presented for their determination. Assuming that a member or some members of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public land or an urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote “NO” in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes or dislikes. The issue before us has nothing to do with the wisdom of the proposed amendments, their desirability, or the danger of the power being abused. The issue is whether or not the voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or the dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a case that the average voter does not know the meaning of “grant” of public land or of “urban land reform.

Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279, GR No L-69401 June 23, 1987

CASE DIGEST

Facts: Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives.  A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing  and photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem  due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue: Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them.

Held: Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution: Theright of the people to be secure in their  persons,houses, papers, and effects againstunreasonablesearches and seizures of whatever nature and forany purpose shall not be violated,and no searchwarrant or warrant of arrest shall issueexcept uponprobable cause to be determined by the judge, orsuch other responsible officer as may beauthorizedby law, after examination under oath or affirmationof the complainant and thewitnesses he mayproduce, and particularlydescribing the place to besearched, and the persons or thingsto be seized. The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the  arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”

Alejano v. Cabuay, GR 160792, August 25, 2005

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which required respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the CA. CA dismissed the petition because the detainees are already charged of coup d’etat. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment.

ISSUE: What is the objective of the writ of habeas corpus?

HELD: The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.

Agustin v. Edu, G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979, 88 SCRA 195

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: This was an original action in the Supreme Court for prohibition.Petitioner was an owner of a volkswagen beetle car,model 13035 already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights which could serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No 229, as amended, as well as the Implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No 1 issued by Land transportation Commission.Respondent Land Transportation commissioner Romeo Edu issued memorandum circular no 32 pursuant to Letter of Instructions No.229,as amended. It required the use of early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles. Petitioner alleged that the letter of instructions, as well as the implementing rules and regulations were unlawful and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether the Letter of Instruction imposes valid measure of police power?

HELD: YES, The court held that the letter of Instruction No.229,as amended as well as the implementing rules and regulations were valid and constitutional as a valid measure of police power. The Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals and the United Nations Organization was ratified by the Philippine local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices.It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance,between the International law and municipal law in applying the rule municipal law prevails.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing

ISSUE : Whether or not the selling of stamps in commemorating the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress does not violate the freedom of religion in the constitution?

HELD: YES .The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people. Any benefit indirectly enjoyed by a religious institution, as long as such benefit was only incidental to a legitimate secular objective would violate the prohibition.

Ablaza v. CIR, G.R. No. L-33906. December 21, 1983

CASE DIGEST

Facts : 36 workers filed a complaint through Association of Democratic Labor Organization for salary differentials pursuant to the statutory minimum wage law, overtime pay and reinstatement with backwages. Respondent court granted the complaint and issued a writ of execution against Cerisco Blackat Trading owned by Petitioner Victoria Ablaza Uy, Hence the petitioner denied and filed a motion for certiorari against the respondent court. Petitioner contended that Cerisco Trading is a mere trade name belonging to herein petitioner, and this tradename is not a juridical person nor entity capable of suing or being sued in any court pursuant to sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court and petitioners was never informed of such complaint.

Issue: Whether or not fraud and fatal irregularities in services of summons, courts process and orders which deprive a party of due notice and right to be heard constitute violation of due process of law guaranty of the constitution.

Held: Certiorari Dismiss

Ratio: Cerisco Blackcat Trading as sole respondent and the body of the complaint makes no mention whatsoever of Victoria Ablaza, the petitioner was not duly served with summons. Petitioner's contentions have no merit. Section 9, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that when persons associated in business are sued under a common name, service may be effected upon all the defendants by serving upon any one of them or upon the person in charge of the office or place of business maintained in the common name. Since petitioner Ablaza Uy were doing business under the common name Cerisco Blackcat Trading, the service of summons made upon the person in charge of the office or place of business maintained in the common name was adequate. This is specially true in this case where the plaintiffs are poor laborers who are entitled under the Constitution to State protection and who are only seeking the legitimate fruits of their employment from an employer.

20th Century Fox Film Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76649-51 August 19, 1988

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting searches and seizures in connection with the NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law).

The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private respondents.  The lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described in the three warrants.

Private respondents later filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the seized properties, which was granted by the lower court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court.

ISSUE: Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier in the absence of probable cause?

RULING: [The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution of the CA.]

YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.

The lower court lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses during the application for search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony, which was the alleged commission of the offense of piracy by the private respondents. Only the petitioner’s counsel who was also a witness during the application stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that the testimony of petitioner’s counsel did not have much credence because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court during the application.

The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.

The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

Commissioner of Public Highways vs. Burgos, 96 Scra 831 (1980)

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: On 1924, the government took private respondent Victor Amigable's land for road-right-of-way purpose.

On 1959, Amigable filed in the Court of First Instance a complaint to recover the ownership and possession of the land and for damages for the alleged illegal occupation of the land by the government (entitled Victor Amigable vs. Nicolas Cuenco, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways and Republic of the Philippines).

Amigable's complaint was dismissed on the grounds that the land was either donated or sold by its owners to enhance its value, and that in any case, the right of the owner to recover the value of said property was already barred by estoppel and the statute of limitations. Also, the non-suability of the government was invoked.

In the hearing, the government proved that the price of the property at the time of taking was P2.37 per square meter. Amigable, on the other hand, presented a newspaper showing that the price was P6.775.

The public respondent Judge ruled in favor of Amigable and directed the Republic of the Philippines to pay Amigable the value of the property taken with interest at 6% and the attorney's fees.

ISSUE:Whether or not the provision of Article 1250 of the New Civil Code is applicable in determining the amount of compensation to be paid to private respondent Amigable for the property taken.

HELD:Not applicable.

RATIO:Article 1250 of the NCC provides that the value of currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment which would be the value of peso at the time of taking of the property when the obligation of the government to pay arises. It is only when there is an agreement that the inflation will make the value of currency at the time of payment, not at the time of the establishment, the basis for payment.

The correct amount of compensation would be P14,615.79 at P2.37 per square meter, not P49,459.34, and the interest in the sum of P145,410.44 at the rate of 6% from 1924 up to the time respondent court rendered its decision as was awarded by the said court should accordingly be reduced.

City Of Manila vs. Chinese Community Of Manila, 40 Phil. 349 (1919)

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

HELD:The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to.

City Government Of Quezon City vs. Ericta, 122 Scra 759 (1983)

FACTS:Quezon City enacted an ordinance  entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensationof a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33, Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, ‘Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.’ The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither can the ordinance in question be justified under sub- section “t”, Section 12 of Republic Act 537 which authorizes the City Council to-

‘prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and provide for their burial in such proper place and in such manner as the council may determine, subject to the provisions of the general law regulating burial grounds andcemeteries and governing funerals and disposal of the dead.’ (Sub-sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep. Act No. 537).

There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or as euphemistically termed by the respondents, ‘donation’.

Churchill vs. Rafferty, G.R. No. L-10572, December 21, 1915 ( 32 Phil 580)

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: The case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs allege otherwise.

ISSUE:Was there valid exercise of police power in this case?

HELD: Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts.

"The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."

"The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law."

"It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "the greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction."

"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."

"It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise."

Ceniza v. Comelec, 96 Scra 763 (1980)

CASE DIGEST

FACTS: Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No. 1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections, Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to suffrage. Further, petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885  insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that “The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need thecontinued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincialofficials in some instances.

The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.

National Power Corporation V. Hon. Sylva G. Aguirre Paderanga, 464 Scra 481 (2005)

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

The Court of Appeals Decision dated June 6, 2002, as well as its Resolution dated August 30, 2002, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25 which granted the complaint for expropriation filed by herein petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) against herein respondents "Petrona Dilao et al." are being assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. To implement its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project, the NPC filed on March 19, 1996 before the Regional Trial Court of Danao City a complaint for expropriation of parcels of land situated at Baring and Cantumog, Carmen, Cebu against Dilao and siblings, and Enriquez. The complaint covers 7,281 square meters of land co-owned Petrona O. Dilao (Dilao) and siblings, and 7,879 square meters of land owned by Estefania Enriquez (Enriquez). A day after the complaint was filed or on March 20, 1996, NPC filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of possession of the lands. Dilao filed her Answer with Counterclaim on April 19, 1996. Enriquez did not. On May 9, 1996, Branch 25 of the RTC Danao, issued an Order granting NPC’s motion for the issuance of writ of possession. It then appointed a Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation.

Issue: Whether or not the just compensation for right-of-way easement being expropriated is proper.

Ruling:

There are two stages in every act of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before the commissioners would be final. In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. It cannot be opposed that NPC’s complaint merely involves a simple case of mere passage of transmission lines over Dilao et. Al’s sproperty. Aside from the actual damage done to the property transversed by the transmission lines, the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on the entire property is unquestionably restricted and perpetually hampered as the environment is made dangerous to the occupant’s life and limb.

The appeal sought by NPC does not stand on both procedural and substantive grounds. The just compensation recommended, which was approved by the trial court, to be just and reasonable compensation for the expropriated property of Dilao and her siblings.

National Housing Authority V. Hon. Pastor P. Reyes, 123 Scra 245 (1983)

Facts:

The undisputed fact that in this certiorari proceeding against respondent Judge for failure to comply with the provision of the Presidential Decrees as to the amount to be paid by petitioner to entitle it to a writ of possession in an expropriation proceeding, no question was raised as to their validity, calls for the grant of the remedy sought. The controversy started with the filing of a complaint with the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Seventh Regional District, Branch II, Cavite City, against private respondents, for the expropriation, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 757, of a parcel of land, with an area of 25,000 square meters, owned and registered in the name of respondent Quirino Austria, and needed for the expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project. Then came from petitioner about a year later, a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioner was able to secure an order placing it in possession. Thereafter, private respondent Quirino Austria filed a Motion to Withdraw Deposit in the amount of P6,600.00, a sum which was equivalent to the value of the property assessed for taxation purposes and which was deposited by petitioner pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 42 . There was an Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw Deposit by petitioner, citing Section 92 of Presidential Decree No. 464.  Petitioner's submission is that the owner's declaration at P1,400.00 which is lower than the assessor's assessment, is the just compensation for the respondents' property, respondents thus being precluded from withdrawing any amount more than P1,400.00.  Respondent Judge, however, issued an order dated July 13, 1978 which, according to petitioner, is clearly contrary to the letter and spirit of the aforecited laws.  There was a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 21, 1978.  Its basis is the provision in Presidential Decree No. 1224: "In the determination of just compensation for such private lands and improvement to be expropriated, the government shall choose between the value of the real property and improvements thereon as declared by the owner or administrator thereof or the market value determined by the City or provincial assessor, whichever is lower, at the time of the filing of the expropriation complaint."  It was then submitted that under the aforequoted statutory provision, the owner's declared market value at P1,400.00 which is lower than that fixed by the assessor is the just compensation of respondent Quirino Austria's property sought to be expropriated. The motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not there was just compensation.

Ruling: 

The issue in this petition for certiorari and mandamus involves the application of a rule introduced by P.D.  No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees that not only promotes social justice but also ends the one-sided practice supported by the conniving consent of government officials and employees, of under declaring properties for the purpose of taxation but ballooning the price thereof when the same properties are to be acquired by the government for public purposes. Put to test is the power of the government to introduce rationality in the laws and to discourage a deceitful practice that is not only damaging to the government officers but also undermines its effort at awakening a democratic responsiveness of the citizenry toward good government and its economic and social programs. The courts should recognize that the rule introduced by P.D. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees does not upset the established concepts of justice or the constitutional provision on just compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed to make his own valuation of his property. The writ of certiorari is granted and the order of respondent judge of July 13, 1978 is hereby nullified and set aside.

Municipality Of Daet Vs Court Of Appeals, 93 Scra 503 (1979)

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

The judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals, subject of the instant petition to review on certiorari, "fixing the fair market value of the property sought to be expropriated at P200.00 per square meter or of Five Hundred Forty three thousand Four hundred (P543,400.00) pesos, and the value of the improvement thereon at Thirty six thousand five hundred (P36,500.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, both amounts to bear legal interest from and after the date of the actual taking of possession by the Municipality of Daet, Camarines Norte until the full amount is paid, with costs against plaintiff-appellant," must be affirmed in the light of the unusual, unique and abnormal circumstances obtaining in this case where the complaint for condemnation was filed on August 9, 1962 or seventeen (17) years ago but up to the present, the petitioner Municipality of Daet has failed to make the deposit required to take possession of the property sought to be expropriated.

Issue: Whether or not the valuation is just, fair and reasonable.

Ruling:

 For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the current and fair market value as declared by the owner or administrator or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that laws shall have only prospective effect. The provisional value of the property in this case having already been fixed, the deposit on February 9, 1973 of the amount of P54,370.00 representing the assessed value of the land and the deposit on October 21, 1977 of the amount of P25,830.00 representing the assessed value of the improvement, both pursuant to the said decree, are not sufficient. Nevertheless, said amounts should be deducted from the total amount due to private respondent. To explain and clarify the judgment of the Court in affirming the decision appealed, the demolition of the building of private respondent standing on the land by the Municipal Mayor, Engr. Jose P. Timoner on February 14, 1978 constituted the actual taking of possession of the property sought to be expropriated by the Municipality of Daet. And from said date, February 14, 1978, interest at the legal rate shall be paid by the municipality until the full amount is paid.

Esmeraldo Morelos V. Hon. Francisco Dela Rosa, 102 Scra 671 (1981)

CASE DIGEST

Facts: 

In a petition for annulment of election with injunction filed in the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Rizal, seeking the annulment of the elections held on January 28, 1968 at Barrio Baclaran, Parañaque, Rizal for the positions of barrio Captain and Barrio Councilmen, petitioners therein allege that said elections were null and void ab initio for the following reasons:  (1.) The list of voters used was null and void because it was made during the illegal registration. (2.) The election was not conducted, the votes were not counted, and the alleged winners were not proclaimed, by a duly elected board of election teller. (3.) The election was not determined, fixed and/or sanctioned by the Baclaran barrio Council as required by law. (4.) Official ballots were not used and all election paraphernalia were supplied by NP candidates; and (5.) The election was conducted in open space, frauds and irregularities were committed such the several persons were able to vote several times while many registered voters who went to the polling place were informed that other persons used their names in voting and that “they have voted already.”

Issues: Whether or not the grounds laid down by petitioners for annulment of the election are justifiable.

Ruling:

The petition is dismissed for being moot and academic, by reason of the expiration of the term of office of the positions disputed by parties, the instant case has been rendered moot and academic. Subsequent to the elections in 1968, elections in the Barrio level were held anew in January 1972, pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 3590, as amended, otherwise known as the revised barrio charter. Petitioners have lost their standing, and it would serve no useful purpose for the court to make any pronouncement on the matter. 

Esteban Morano V. Hon. Martiniano Vivo, 102 Scra 562 (1967)

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines on November 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left China and her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China. Chan Sau wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage. Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash bond of 4,000 pesos. On January 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on September 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962. In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.

Issue: Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She is a non-immigrant. Under Section 13 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9. Therefore, first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign country; second, she must procure from the appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter undergo examination by the officials of the Bureau of Immigration at the port of entry for determination of her admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the immigration Act..

Warrants of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities only for the purpose of carrying out a final finding of a violation of law, like an order of deportation or an order of contempt, and not for the sole purpose of investigation or prosecution. It is also held that the requirement of probable cause is not applicable in deportation proceedings, which are not criminal in nature. The order of deportation is purely administrative, its purpose being not punishment but the return to his country of the alien who has violated the conditions for the admission to the local state.