Hilario Camino Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil 1 (1948)

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

Petitioner stands accused of treason before the people’s Court, the information against him having been filed by Prosecutor Ladaw on February 28, 1946. Almost a year before, on April 4, 1945, at about 6:00 p.m., petitioner was arrested by members of the Counter Intelligence Corps of the United States Army at his residence at 199-A San Rafael St., Manila, without any warrant of arrest, and taken to the Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa, where he was detained.

On April 11, 1945, petitioner's wife, who transferred to their house at 3 Rosario Drive, Quezon City, was approached by several CIC officers, headed by Lt. Olves, and ordered to accompany them to the house at San Rafael to witness the taking of documents and things belonging to petitioner. Upon hearing from the officers that they did not have any search warrant for the purpose, she refused to go with them, but after the officers told her that with or without her presence they would search the house at San Rafael, Mrs. Moncado decide to accompany them. Upon arrival at the house, Mrs. Moncado noticed that their belongings had been ransacked by American officers and that the trunks which she had kept in the attic and in the garage when she left the house, had been ripped open and their contents scattered on the floor. Lt. Olves informed Mrs. Moncado that they were going to take a bundle of documents and things, which were separated from the rest of the scattered things, because they proved the guilt of her husband. Mrs. Moncado protested in vain. No receipt was issued to her. Subsequently, after making an inventory of their belongings at San Rafael, Mrs. Moncado found the important documents and correspondence missing.

Issue:  Whether or not illegally seized evidence is admissible in court.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court, following the U.S. case of Wolf V. Colorado, rules that evidence illegally obtained is not necessarily excluded if is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence in such case, the evidence admitted, without prejudice to any criminal, civil or administrative liability of the officer who illegally seized it. In other words, the admissibility of the evidence is not effected  by the illegality of the means by which it was acquired.

The evidence illegally seized is still admissible as long as it is not excluded by the rules of court, on the theory that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely because “the constable has been blundered”.

Mataas Na Lupa Tenants Association v. Carlos Dimayuga, 130 SCRA 30 (1984)

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

 On January 17, 1969, petitioners filed a complaint for the exercise of preferential rights with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV. The said complaint alleged that petitioner association has for its members Nicolas Aglabay, et al., which members are heads of 110 tenant families, and who have been, for more than ten years prior to 1959, occupants of a parcel of land (with their 110 houses built thereon), formerly owned by the respondent, Juliana Diez Vda. de Gabriel, to whom petitioners have been paying rents for the lease thereof, but who, on May 14, 1968, without notice to petitioners, sold the same to respondent Carlos Dimayuga, who, in turn, mortgaged the same to her for the balance of the purchase price; that according to Republic Act 1162, as amended by Republic Act 2342, a parcel of land in Manila and suburbs, with at least fifty (50) houses of tenants erected thereon and actually leased to said tenants for at least ten (10) years prior to June 20, 1959, may not be sold by the landowner to any person other than such tenants, unless the latter renounced their rights in a public instrument; that without said tenants-appellants having renounced their preferential rights in public instrument, respondent Vda. de Gabriel sold the land to respondent Dimayuga; that petitioners-tenants are willing to purchase said land at the same price and on the same terms and conditions observed in the contract of sale with respondent Dimayuga; and that since aforesaid contract of sale is expressly prohibited by law, the same is null and void, while it is mandatory for respondent Vda. de Gabriel to execute such sale to petitioners, Petitioners therefore prayed that said contract of sale be declared void, and that respondent Vda. de Gabriel be ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of petitioners at the same price and conditions followed in the contract with respondent Dimayuga, plus attorney's fees and damages.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have the pre-emptive or preferential rights to buy the land in question.

Ruling: 

This preferential right of petitioners and the power of eminent domain have been further mandated, strengthened and expanded by recent developments in law and jurisprudence. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Sec. 2 Art. IV). The state shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of the people. Toward this end, the state shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits (Sec. 6 Art. 11).

P.D. No. 1517 was enacted and Proclamation No. 1967 as an Implementing law, undoubtedly adopts and crystallizes the greater number of people when it speaks of tenants and residents in declared urban land reform zones or areas without any mention of the land area covered by such zones. The focus is on people who would stand to benefit and not on the size of the land involved. The 110 tenant-families have been vested with the right of first refusal to purchase the land in question within a reasonable time and reasonable prices, subject to Ministry of Human Settlements rules and regulations. The Oct. 30, 1969 order is set aside and the Ministry of Human Settlements is hereby directed to facilitate administer the implementation of the rights of petitioners.

Soriano Mata v. Hon. Josephine K. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720. March 26, 1984

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

The contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based merely on application for Search Warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents which were wrongfully allegedly subscribed, and sworn to before the Clerk of Court. Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part of the respondent Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinently under PD 810, as amended by PD1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took, and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets knows as Masiao tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai and Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.

Issue: Whether or not Search Warrant is valid?

Ruling:

No. The Search Warrant is declared as illegal. Deposition, sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to property determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving if it will be found later his declarations are false.

FULL TEXT

SORIANO MATA, Petitioner, v. HON. JOSEPHINE K. BAYONA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc, BERNARDO GOLES and REYNALDO MAYOTE, Respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge (not reappointed) is challenged by petitioner for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.

Specifically, the contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based merely on the application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents which were wrongfully it is alleged subscribed, and sworn to before the Clerk of Court of respondent Judge. Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part of respondent Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinent to the issuance of the search warrant to the records of Criminal Case No. 4298-CC wherein petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned." 1

Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry respondent Judge replied, "it is with the court." The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by respondent Judge on March 1, 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. 2 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to this Court, with the instant petition, praying, among others, that this Court declare the search warrant to be invalid and all the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.

Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The judge’s insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has become dubious by petitioner’s claim that at the particular time when he examined all the relevant papers connected with the issuance of the questioned search warrant, after he demanded the same from the lower court since they were not attached to the records, he did not find any certification at the back of the joint affidavit of the complainants. As stated earlier, before he filed his motion to quash the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, he was furnished, upon his request, certified true copies of the said affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which certified true copies do not bear any certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox copy of the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case does not show also the certification of respondent judge. This doubt becomes more confirmed by respondent Judge’s own admission, while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the applicants, that "she did not take the deposition of Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be to hold a judicial proceeding which will be open and public", 3 such that, according to her, the persons subject of the intended raid will just disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else.

Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the defect of the warrant? Be that as it may, there was no "deposition in writing" attached to the records of the case in palpable disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore quoted.

Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to stop the illegal gambling that lures every man, woman and child, and even the lowliest laborer who could hardly make both ends meet justifies her action. She claims that in order to abate the proliferation of this illegal "masiao" lottery, she thought it more prudent not to conduct the taking of deposition which is done usually and publicly in the court room.

Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral examination. 4 A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or taken in writing, under oath or affirmation before a commissioner, examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and cross interlocutory, and usually subscribed by the witnesses. 5 The searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in writing.cralawnad

The other point is that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government." 6

Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. 7 No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it. 8

While We hold that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, 9 it was held that the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of March 1, 1979 denying the motion to annul the search warrant as well as the order of March 21, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby reversed, the search warrant, being declared herein as illegal. Notwithstanding such illegality, the things seized under such warrant, such as stock of "masiao" tickets; "masiao" issue tickets; bet money; control pad or "masiao" numbers; stamping pad with rubber stamp marked Ormoc City Jai-Alai," cannot be returned as sought by petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Marvel Building Corporation v. Hon. Blas Ople, 122 SCRA 405, G.R. No. L-44302, May 20, 1983

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

A procedural due process issue is raised in this certiorari proceeding against private respondent Imelda V.C. Haw and public respondents then Officer-in-Charge Vicente Leogardo, Jr. of Regional Office No. 04, Department of Labor and the then Secretary of Labor Blas Ople. The alleged grievance consists of an order of reinstatement of private respondent with back wages issued by respondent Leogardo, Jr. upheld by respondent Ople.  A verified complaint for illegal dismissal from her position as Secretary was filed against petitioner-corporation by private respondent. The complaint was duly docketed and accordingly set for summary investigation. There was due notice to the manager of petitioner, as evidenced by a photocopy of the official dispatch record of the telegraph organization, as concerned. At the scheduled summary investigation of the case, complainant, now-private respondent, appeared. There was no appearance on the part of petitioner. The investigation took place with evidence offered by private respondent as to the fact of employment and her subsequent dismissal without prior clearance from the Department of Labor. The finding was that no such clearance was first obtained. The order of then Officer-in-Charge respondent Leogardo, Jr., to reinstate Imelda V.C. Haw with back wages until she was back in her employment was then issued. Petitioner then filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the order dated June 4, 1976, alleging lack of due process. Such motion was considered as an appeal and the matter was elevated to then Secretary of Labor, respondent Ople, who sustained the same. Hence this certiorari proceeding.

Issue: Whether or not there was due process.

Ruling:

The petition for certiorari proceeding was dismissed. It is of common knowledge and practice that during any stage of investigation or hearing, when any of the parties fail to appear during the initial hearing, the absent party is given another chance to appear and present his evidence. In the comment submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General, it included proof of petition having received notice a day before the scheduled summary investigation. Petitioner’s imputation of having been denied due process is presentation negated by the fact that it filed a motion for reconsideration. Neither did the petition in its aforesaid motion, mentioned what evidence it intends to present, if granted another hearing, to offset private respondent’s claim on the matter. Thus, the denial of its motion for reconsideration is merited not only by the supremacy of reason but likewise the dictates of justice.

FULL TEXT

G.R. No. L-44302 May 20, 1983

MARVEL BUILDING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE BLAS F. OPLE, as Secretary of Labor, HONORABLE VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., as Office-in-Charge, Regional Office No. 04, Department of Labor and IMELDA V.C. HAW respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

A procedural due process issue is raised in this certiorari proceeding against private respondent Imelda V.C. Haw and public respondents then Officer-in-Charge Vicente Leogardo, Jr. of Regional Office No. 04, Department of Labor and the then Secretary of Labor Blas Ople. The alleged grievance consists of an order of reinstatement of private respondent with back wages issued by respondent Leogardo, Jr. upheld by respondent Ople. The facts show that a verified complaint for illegal dismissal from her position as Secretary was filed against petitioner corporation by private respondent. The complaint was duly docketed as LAS-T-IV-4880-76 and accordingly set for summary investigation. There was due notice to the manager of petitioner, as evidenced by a xerox copy of the official dispatch record of the telegraph organization,'as concerned. At the scheduled summary investigation of the case, complainant, now-private respondent, appeared. There was no appearance on the part of petitioner. The investigation took place with evidence offered by private respondent as to the fact of employment and her subsequent dismissal without prior clearance from the Department of Labor. The finding was that no such clearance was first obtained. The order of then Officer-in-Charge respondent Leogardo, Jr., to reinstate Imelda V.C. Haw with back wages until she was back in her employment was then issued. Petitioner then filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the order dated June 4, 1976, alleging lack of due process. Such motion was considered as an appeal and the matter was elevated to then Secretary of Labor, respondent Ople, who sustained the same. Hence this certiorari proceeding.

The allegation that under the above facts there was denial of due process is set forth thus in the petition "it is of common knowledge and practice that during any stage of investigation or hearing in the Department of Labor whether by the mediator-conciliator or during the NLRC compulsory arbitration that when any of the parties fail to appear during the initial hearing, the absent party is given another chance to appear and present his evidence. It is amazing, however, with due respect that respondents, O.I.C. Vicente Leogardo, Jr. and Secretary, Blas F. Ople should now deny the petitioner the chance afforded to others who also fail to attend the scheduled hearing, especially so, when such failure can be attributed to excusable negligence and when there is a valid and meritorious defense against the complaint" of private respondent. ¹ It was presentation alleged that on the day of the scheduled hearing, the notice has not as yet been received by petitioner that led to its being declared in default. It was not given, to quote from the petition anew, "another chance to appear [contrary to] what is usually done in cases like this." ²

In the Comment submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General, which was considered as the answer, such contention was refuted by including proof of petitioner having received notice a day before the scheduled summary investigation. ³ Moreover, according to such Comment, "petitioner's imputation of having been denied due process is presentation negated by the fact that it filed a motion for reconsideration (Catura v. CIR, 37 SCRA 303; Demaronsing v. Tandayag, 58 SCRA 484). Petitioner could have easily established the lack of employer-employee relationship if such was really the case. But then petitioner herein, without more, cursorily denied, in a general manner at that, the existence of such a relationship. And, neither did the petitioner in its aforesaid motion intimate what evidence it intends to present, if granted another hearing, to offset private respondent's claim on the matter. Verily, it is apparent that petitioner herein does not seriously dispute said issue. Thus, the denial of its motion for reconsideration is merited not only by the supremacy of reason but likewise the dictates of justice." ⁴

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.

The dismissal of the petition is thus the only justifiable outcome. This conclusion becomes even more evident when it is duly noted that what is involved is security of tenure as protected by the Constitution. ⁵ In the latest decision in point, Alzosa v. National Labor Relations Commission, ⁶ this Court first cited Philippine Air Lines Inc. v. Philippine Airlines Employees Association. ⁷ Then it tategorically stated: "This Court has since then consistently vitalized the guarantee of security of tenure. ⁸

^{WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.}